2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus come per vedere chi si ama sul dating for seniors senza pagare verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is per dog? We saw above that one possible response esatto Chrysippus’ paradox was sicuro claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is verso dog, then, given the canone account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Per fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus a hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and durante fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply to avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar alone. But the maximality principle may seem esatto be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark con unison? If per thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be trapu of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (sopra various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and sopra fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still durante place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some in verso day, some mediante per second, or a split second. It seems arbitrary puro proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is per split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one a day away is per Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems esatto favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Durante any case, the canone account of identity seems unable on its own to handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is verso dog – and verso Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark mediante unison mai more loudly than Oscar barks aureola.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions per new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes per part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by a new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical sicuro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical sicuro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical sicuro both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants durante quantified modal logic are onesto be handled exactly as they are mediante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced sicuro affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The norma account is thus avanti facie incompatible with the natural pensiero that constitution is identity.